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say, if the second instance dismisses the appeal in this case, the dispute 
between X and Y about the validity of the settlement is not concluded, and 
it is unavoidable that X or Y will file another action.
（2） Can the court of second instance dismiss the appeal partially?
 Although the second instance has no choice but to dismiss the appeal 
about the part that is not well-grounded, it seems possible for the court to 
uphold the appeal about the part that is well-grounded. However, the 
Supreme Court decided that the court of the second instance has no 
choice but to dismiss the appeal as a whole, because such a dismissal 
“would lead to making the close of the litigation effective for only part of 
the claim subject to the settlement, although it should have become 
effective for the claim as a whole”.
 Even a settlement in litigation may involve a person who is not a party 
in litigation or a matter that has no relation to the claim in the action. So, 
the validity of settlement has to be determined as a whole （see Case 
C o m m e n t , 1421 HA N R E I TA I M U Z U 101 , 103 （2016））. I f t h e a p p e a l i s 
dismissed partially, the judgment of the first instance about that part 
remains valid, but such a situation is inappropriate for one with the nature 
of a settlement; the wholeness of settlement. This point also has not been 
discussed well academically, so it needs to be examined.
4. The conclusion of this judgment 
 This new judgment decided that the court of second instance has no 
way but to dismiss the whole appeal , because of the principle of 
prohibition of modifying the judgment disadvantageously and the nature of 
settlement. However, as mentioned above, such a judgment cannot resolve 
the dispute, and X or Y will bring another action. Even if this new decision 
of the Supreme Court is proper in the light of theory, there is room to 
examine whether this decision is proper in the light of a case resolution.
5.　Commercial Law
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Summary:
 The Supreme Court denied the application of an illiquidity discount in 
determining a fair price for an unlisted company using an income approach 
in an appraisal action based on Article 785, Paragraph 1 of the Companies 
Act.
Reference:
 Companies Act, Articles 785 and 786
Facts:
 Seico Fresh Foods, K.K. （“SFF”） was a limited liability corporation 
established in 1940, and engaged in wholesale business in foods and 
drinks.  The shares in the SFF were restricted on transfer.   Doto Seico 
Fresh Foods, K.K. （“DSFF”） was a limited liability corporation established 
in 1925, and engaged in wholesale and retail business in food and drinks. 
The shares in DSFF were restricted on transfer.  X was a shareholder 
holding 325,950 shares in DSFF.  SFF and DSFF were subsidiaries of 
Seico Mart, K.K.
 SFF and DSFF entered into a merger agreement under which DSFF 
（the disappearing company） would merge into SFF （the surviving 
company）.  Under the agreement, six DSFF shares would be exchanged 
for one SFF share. X sent a notice in writing that X would vote against the 
merger at the shareholders meeting. DSFF held a shareholders meeting 
on August 8, 2012, in which X voted against the merger. X requested DSFF 
to purchase X’s shares.  On October 1, 2012, the merger between SFF and 
DSFF took effect.  SFF offered X to purchase X’s shares at JPY 71 per 
share, and X declined it.  X filed an appraisal action on November 21, 2012.
 The District Court of Sapporo determined the fair price as JPY 80 per 
share.  In determining the fair price, the District Court applied the 
illiquidity discount of 25% because the transfer of shares was restricted and 
it was a minority portion of shares.
 The Sapporo High Court affirmed the District Court’s decision, and 
specifically noted that the court can take into account the difficulty of 
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conversion into cash in determining the fair price.
 
Opinion:
 The court has reasonable discretion in determining the fair price 
under the appraisal action under Companies Act, Article 786, Paragraph 2. 
Though various valuation methods for an unlisted company are available, it 
is construed that the court has reasonable discretion to choose which 
method to use under what circumstances.
 Illiquidity discount is applied because shares in an unlisted company 
do not have marketability and have less liquidity in comparison to listed 
company shares.  However, because appraisal rights are granted to give an 
opportunity to exit for the dissenting shareholders, and to give an 
appropriate share of the enterprise value, the illiquidity discount should 
not be applied to a price calculated based on the income approach.




 This is the first decision decided by the Supreme Court that the 
illiquidity discount should not be applied to the price in calculating the fair 
price based on the income approach for an unlisted company.
 The Supreme Court emphasized that the appraisal rights are granted 
to the dissenting shareholders to allot the appropriate share of the 
enterprise value.  Especially, it seems that the Supreme Court considers it 
important that the Companies Act requires the court to determine the fair 
price for the appraisal action. It seems that this is one of main reasons for 
the Supreme Court to decline to apply the illiquidity discount.  However, 
allotting the appropriate share does not necessarily or logically relate to 
the illiquidity discount. Or does it mean that the Supreme Court denied 
any discount at the shareholder level when the price is calculated based on 
the income approach?  I think that the Supreme Court should have 
clarified how allocating the enterprise value logically relates to the denial 
of an illiquidity discount （or a discount at the shareholder level generally）.
